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The debate on human rationality goes to
the heart of fundamental questions about
human existence. When can we say that a
decision is correct? What is the basis for
the achievements of the human intellect?
What is the most important cognitive dis-
tinction between humans and non-human
organisms? Proposals of rationality have
an interesting status as psychological the-
ories. They are not quite theories of deci-
sion making in practice—such theories
are referred to as descriptive theories, to
imply that they describe what goes on.
Rather, proposals of rationality are nor-
mative theories, to imply theories of how
people ought to reason, if they seek deci-
sion outcomes, which are deemed to be
correct, on the basis of some absolute stan-
dard (here, we are simplifying a complex
debate; arguments have been expressed
against a distinction between normative
and descriptive rationality as we make
above, e.g., Elqayam and Evans, 2011,
2013). Of course, a normative theory must
be partly a descriptive theory as well, since
it is assumed that humans can, in prin-
ciple, sometimes, reason on the basis of
the normative prescription (they may just
not do so, in typical situations, perhaps
due to process demands or time or other
constraints).
Currently, the dominant approach to
normative rationality is based on classi-
cal probability (CP) theory. This approach
was established after a major shift in con-
ceptual thinking about rationality. Before
(effectively since antiquity), it was believed
that the standard for correctness in deci-
sion making was classical logic. But this
position came under intense scrutiny, with
experimental results showing that naïve
participants, even in simple tasks, would
not reason in a way consistent with clas-
sical logic (Wason, 1960). One reaction to
such results was to develop dual theories of
reasoning, which would, broadly speaking,
involve a rational component and a heuris-
tics one (cf. Sloman, 1996). However,
a priori arguments emerged against any
kind of role of logic in human practi-
cal decision making (i.e., decision making
exempting mathematical/ scientific etc.;
Chater and Oaksford, 1993). By contrast,
a theory of rationality (and decision mak-
ing) based on probability theory seemed
(and seems) to align itself closely with the
intuition we have about what it means for
decision making to be successful. Such a
theory is about the use of available infor-
mation from the environment, so as to
optimally predict the probability of future
events (Anderson, 1991; Oaksford and
Chater, 2007; Tenenbaum et al., 2011). The
fact that the classical prescription appears
to be consistent with human cognition in
many cases (e.g., Griffiths et al., 2010, and
the above references) also corroborates the
psychological relevance of CP theory.
There are formal arguments to support
the notion that CP theory provides a cor-
rect association of probabilities to uncer-
tain events. The Dutch Book Theorem
(DBT; e.g., Howson and Urbach, 1993)
shows that if one assigns probabilities
to events in a way inconsistent with the
axioms of CP theory, then it is possible to
identify a combination of stakes (money
to be won or lost, depending on whether
the events occur or not), which guaran-
tees a loss (or gain, depending on the sign
of the stakes). That is, according to the
DBT, when failing to follow the rules of
CP theory, you may be vulnerable to a
sure loss (extensions to the DBT, such as
the Converse DBT, have been presented
too; Vineberg, 2011). Note that the DBT
is based on value maximization, but it is
well established that reasoners are typically
e.g., risk averse (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). Wakker (2010) showed that risk
averse decision makers are subject to a
Dutch Book, which provides an interesting
conundrum, since expected utility theory,
which allows for a risk averse utility func-
tion, is considered the rational theory of
risky decision making. Nevertheless, the
utility of the DBT, in relation to a theory
of rationality based on CP theory, is that it
provides a formal justification for why CP
theory provides the normative prescrip-
tion for decision making. In other words,
currently, if one is interested in whether
a probabilistic decision is correct or not,
then one needs to explore its consistency
with the prescription from CP theory.
The above is an extremely powerful
and useful conclusion. Unfortunately, we
believe it is vulnerable to criticism. We
present two arguments against it, moti-
vated from the interest in applying quan-
tum probability (QP) theory in cognitive
modeling. By QP theory, we imply the
mathematics for assigning probabilities to
events from quantum mechanics, without
the physics. QP theory is a formal theory
of probability, like CP theory. QP and CP
theories are based on different axioms and
so their predictions can diverge. QP theory
is a plausible contender in decisionmaking
(and rationality). Recent work has shown
that QP principles can provide the basis
for simple, constrained models for empiri-
cal findings, which have been persistently
problematic from a classical perspective,
such as order effects on choice (Moore,
2002), the conjunction fallacy (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1983), and the disjunc-
tion fallacy (Shafir and Tversky, 1992), for
example, in Pothos and Busemeyer (2009),
Trueblood and Busemeyer (2011), and
Wang and Busemeyer (2013). Moreover,
QP principles have been successfully
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applied in other areas of cognition, such
as memory (Bruza et al., 2009), percep-
tion (Atmanspacher and Filk, 2010), and
conceptual combination [Aerts (2009);
overviews in Busemeyer and Bruza (2011),
Pothos and Busemeyer (2013), Wang et al.
(2013)].
The above points attest to the descrip-
tive status of QP theory in cognitive the-
ory, not its normative status. Nevertheless,
they motivate a consideration of explana-
tory concepts from QP theory in psy-
chological debates. Of relevance presently
is the idea of incompatibility, in relation
to two (or more) questions (or possibil-
ities etc.). According to classical theory,
all questions are compatible, which means
that the answer to any set of questions can
be known concurrently. Following from
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1983) experi-
ment which led to the finding of the con-
junction fallacy, for example, classically, it
can be established that Linda is a bank
teller at the same time as deciding whether
Linda is a feminist. As a result, it is always
possible to specify a joint probability dis-
tribution for the outcomes of any arbi-
trary set of questions (this is the principle
of unicity; Griffiths, 2003). The intuition
that such questions are compatible appears
obvious. How could it possibly be other-
wise? Yet, in QP theory questions can be
compatible or incompatible. In the latter
case, certainty about one inexorably causes
uncertainty about the other. Thus, resolv-
ing the question about whether Linda is a
bank teller requires that we are uncertain
about whether she is a feminist, and vice
versa. Incompatibility means that there is
no single sample space against which we
can assess all possible questions about a
system of interest (such as Linda). Rather,
certainty about a particular question cre-
ates a novel perspective (sample space),
against which the remaining questions
can be assessed (these ideas broadly res-
onate with Evans’s, 2006, 2007, “singu-
larity” principle). Equally, incompatibility
implies that it is impossible to define a
joint probability distribution for the cor-
responding questions. One can only define
a probability for a sequence of two events,
which is order dependent.
The above leads us to our first point.
We think that the representational require-
ments from the principle of unicity are
cognitively unrealistic. If we imagine a
representation space in which all ques-
tion outcomes are compatible, then, for
two questions, each axis corresponds to a
particular combination of outcomes (one
axis would correspond to the combina-
tion that Linda is a bank teller and not
a feminist, etc.). For two questions with
binary outcomes, we need a four dimen-
sional space. The consideration of each
additional binary question increases the
dimensionality of the space by a factor of
two, so that, for N binary questions, we
require 2N dimensions. A classical space
for just 10 binary questions requires over
1000 dimensions. The CP theory require-
ments for representational capacity appear
too stringent. Another way to look at
this issue is that, regardless of the num-
ber of questions considered, classically it
is always possible to construct a com-
plete joint probability distribution. But,
where would the information come from
to construct such a joint probability distri-
bution, especially when considering unfa-
miliar combinations of questions (such as
being a bank teller or a feminist)? Note, the
principle of indifference cannot provide a
general solution to this issue (e.g., Gilboa,
2009).
Thus, we suggest that cognitively it is
more plausible to consider some ques-
tions, especially ones not typically con-
sidered together, as incompatible. Indeed,
there have been suggestions that, with
practice, some of the decision making
fallacies attenuate (Nilsson et al., 2014;
Trueblood, pers. commu.). This conclu-
sion reduces the plausibility that CP theory
provides a good descriptive framework for
decision making. By implication, QP the-
ory is perhaps a framework for bounded
rationality Simon, 1955: Perhaps not as
rational as in principle possible (assuming
CP theory is the ultimate standard of ratio-
nality), but the best that can be achieved,
given (broadly assumed) limitations in the
representational capacity of the cognitive
system.
This discussion leads to our second
point: exactly what is the evidence that
probabilistic inference on the basis of CP
theory is as accurate as possible? An a
priori argument is the DBT. The con-
sistency in probabilistic inference, which
is demonstrated with the DBT, perhaps
implies accuracy as well (i.e., do CP the-
ory probabilities match empirical data?). Is
it possible to prove a version of the DBT
for QP theory as well? Superficially, this
may appear not to be the case. First, the
axioms of CP theory (on the basis of which
the DBT is proved) are very different from
those of QP theory. Second, verifiably (e.g.,
Gilio and Over, 2012), a classical decision
maker, committing the conjunction fallacy
in Tversky and Kahneman’s (1983) exper-
iment, is subject to a Dutch Book, that is,
it is possible to specify a combination of
stakes for the various hypotheses (Linda is
a bank teller; Linda is a feminist; Linda is a
bank teller and a feminist), which lead to a
sure loss (or gain). However, it is possible
to express the requirements for the DBT in
terms of the fundamental principles of QP
theory. Moreover, it is certainly true that if
the questions about Linda are compatible
(i.e., if we assume all events can be placed
within the same sample space), then a
Dutch Book is possible. But, if they are
incompatible this is no longer necessarily
the case, because the probabilities involved
are based on different conditions (orders
of evaluation). With work in progress, we
are formalizing the relevant intuitions, but
the idea is that accepting one incompatible
outcome for Linda (e.g., that she is fem-
inist) creates a separate sample space for
another (e.g., that she is a bank teller).
We return to the question of the accu-
racy of probabilistic inference, since, ulti-
mately, this must be the standard against
which we assess whether CP theory or
QP theory provide a better framework for
understanding rationality. Our view is this:
if all the relevant questions are compati-
ble, then rationality is best understood in
terms of CP theory (actually, the predic-
tions between CP theory and QP theory
with compatible questions would be iden-
tical; but, if all questions are compatible,
why consider QP theory?). However, if
some of the questions are incompatible,
then QP theory will provide more accu-
rate predictions for probabilistic inference.
For example, if some questions are incom-
patible, then order effects may arise in
conjunctions (Trueblood and Busemeyer,
2011; Wang and Busemeyer, 2013), while
conjunction in CP theory is commutative
(order effects can arise classically, but not
without e.g., a conditionalization depend-
ing on order, which is unlikely to be known
a priori). There are many effects of this
kind, that is, ways in which the knowledge
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that two questions are incompatible can
lead us to probabilistic predictions diver-
gent from those using CP theory. Thus,
the question of whether QP theory is a
better or worse standard for rational deci-
sion making, compared to CP theory, boils
down to whether there are questions which
are incompatible or not (cf. Oaksford,
2013). This is an exciting empirical issue.
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